CS 161 Computer Security

HW3

This practice exam was generated for foo@bar.com.

To prepare you for the midterm format, Homework 3 is formatted exactly like the midterm. Please write your answers on the practice answer sheet (or a blank piece of paper if you don't have printer access), and submit scans or pictures of the filled-out answer sheet to the "Homework 3" assignment on Gradescope.

Practice answer sheet link: https://cs161.org/assets/mt/practice mt answer sheet.pdf

For questions with circular bubbles, you may select exactly one choice on the answer sheet.
O Unselected option
Only one selected option
For questions with square checkboxes , you may select <i>zero</i> or more choices on the answer sheet.
You can select
multiple squares
For questions with a large box , you need to provide justification in the blank space below the question on the answer sheet.
You have 1 week (110 minutes for the actual exam). There are 3 questions of varying credit (61 points total).

The exam is open note. You can use an unlimited number of handwritten cheat sheets, but you must work alone.

[NOTE: This homework has no instant feedback, so instead we will grade this homework out of 40 points.

We will have a form where you can ask clarification questions. Please check the clarifications page periodically during the exam.

MANDATORY - Honor Code

Anything above 40 points is full credit on the homework.]

Read the following honor code and sign your name on your answer sheet. Failure to do so will result in a grade of 0 for this exam.

I understand that I may not collaborate with anyone else on this exam, or cheat in any way. I am aware of the Berkeley Campus Code of Student Conduct and acknowledge that academic misconduct will be reported to the Center for Student Conduct and may further result in partial or complete loss of credit.

O1 True/False (14 points) Each true/false is worth 2 points unless otherwise specified. [NOTE: The first question on the exam will always be True/False.] Q1.1 True or False: Suppose there is a transmission error in a block B of ciphertext using CBC mode. This error propagates to every subsequent block in decryption, which means that the block *B* and every block after B cannot be decrypted correctly. TRUE FALSE Q1.2 True or False: The IV for CBC mode must be kept secret. TRUE FALSE Q1.3 True or False: The random number r in El Gamal can be made public. TRUE FALSE Q1.4 True or False: If the daily lottery numbers are truly random, then they can be used as the entropy for a one-time-pad since a one-time-pad needs to be random. TRUE FALSE Q1.5 True or False: It is okay if multiple people use the same modulus p for their El Gamal public key. FALSE TRUE Q1.6 True or False: Alice and Bob share a symmetric key k. Alice sends Bob a message encrypted with k stating, "I owe you \$100", using AES-CBC encryption. Assuming AES is secure, we can be confident that an active attacker cannot tamper with this message; its integrity is protected. TRUE FALSE Q1.7 True or False: Alice and Bob share a secret symmetric key k which they use for calculating MACs. Alice sends the message M = "I, Alice, owe you, Bob, \$100" to Bob along with its message authentication code MAC_k(M). Bob can present (M, MAC_k(M)) to a judge as proof that Alice owes him \$100 since a MAC provides integrity. FALSE TRUE [NOTE: You may not need all blanks on the answer sheet for a question. For this question, you should leave Q1.8-Q1.10 blank.] This is the end of Q1. Proceed to Q2 on your answer sheet.

f is	one-way if given $f(x)$ it is hard	actions" and "collision-resistance' to find x' such that $f(x') = f(x)$. Ind two inputs x , y such that $f(x)$	Likewise, we say a function f is	
For or r	•	low, determine if it is one-way or	not, and if it is collision-resistant	
Q2.1	(3 points) $H(x) = x$			
		six answer choices for every sub- cample, for Q2.1 here, you shoul		
	(A) One-way	O(C) Both	(E) —	
	(B) Collision-resistant	(D) Neither	(F) ——	
Q2.2	(3 points) $H(x) = x \mod 2$			
	[NOTE: The answer choices on this subpart are circular bubbles, so you should only bubble in one option out of (G), (H), (I), and (J) on your answer sheet for Q2.2.]			
	(G) One-way	(I) Both	(K) —	
	(H) Collision-resistant	(J) Neither	(L) —	
Q2.3	3 (3 points) $H(x) = E_k(x)$, where where E_k is a ideally secure block cipher with a known and published key k .			
	(A) One-way	O(C) Both	(E) ——	
	(B) Collision-resistant	(D) Neither	(F) ——	
Q2.4	(3 points) $H(x) = 0$			
	(G) One-way	(I) Both	(K) —	
	(H) Collision-resistant	(J) Neither	(L) —	
[NC	OTE: You should leave Q2.5 and Ç) 2.6 blank on your answer sheet.	Also, since none of the subparts	

(12 points)

Q2 Hashing Functions

blank.]

This is the end of Q2. Proceed to Q3 on your answer sheet.

of this question asked for a short answer, you should leave the space below Q2 on your answer sheet

Q3 Finding Common Patients

(35 points)

Caltopia has two hospitals: Bear Hospital and Tree Hospital, each with a database of confidential medical records. Each record is a tuple (p_i, m_i) , where p_i is a patient's full name and m_i is the patient's medical record. Each Caltopian citizen has a unique name.

Each hospital has a list of records, $(x_1, m_1), ..., (x_n, m_n)$ for Bear Hospital and $(y_1, m_1), ..., (y_n, m_n)$ for Tree Hospital.

Note: the values of m_i may differ between the two hospitals, even for the same patient.

The two hospitals wish to identify patients that attend both hospitals, but are afraid of eavesdroppers like Eve (who has a list of all the plaintext names of the citizens of Caltopia) listening in.

Bear Hospital and Tree Hospital share a key k that is not known to anyone else. Assume r_i is some random bitstring, and \parallel is the bitwise concatenation operation.

Q3.1 (5 points) Tree Hospital suggests applying some cryptographic function to its list of users, transforming it into a list $(y_1^*, y_2^*, ..., y_n^*)$, which it will send to Bear Hospital.

Bear Hospital will then either decrypt y_i^* , or compute x_i^* in the same way and compare (whichever is appropriate).

Which of the following give y_i^* such that Eve cannot win the IND-CPA game? Select all that apply.

[NOTE: The answer choices on this subpart are square bubbles, so you should bubble in any of options (A), (B), (C), (D), (E) you think are correct, or only option (F) if you think all options are incorrect.]

$\square (A) y_i^* = SHA(y_i)$	$\square (D) y_i^* = AES-CBC_k(y_i)$
$\square \text{ (B) } y_i^* = r_i \text{SHA}(y_i r_i)$	\square (E) $y_i^* = AES-CBC_k(SHA(y_i))$
$\square (C) y_i^* = AES_k(r_i) SHA(y_i r_i)$	\square (F) None of the above

Q3.2 (5 points) For the rest of the question, assume that the lengths of each name are different, and each name is between 1 and 127 bytes long.

Which of the following give y_i^* such that Eve cannot learn anything about the patient names in this new threat model? Select all that apply.

[NOTE: On "select all that apply" questions, you get 1 point for every correct option you choose, and 1 point for every incorrect option that you correctly leave blank (every option is graded independently). For example, if the correct answer is (G) and (H), and you choose (G) and (I), you would get 3/5 points (+1 for choosing (G), and +2 for leaving (J) and (K) blank).]

$\square (G) \ y_i^* = SHA(y_i)$	\square (J) $y_i^* = AES-CBC_k(y_i)$
$\square \text{ (H) } y_i^* = r_i \text{SHA}(y_i r_i)$	\square (K) $y_i^* = AES-CBC_k(SHA(y_i))$
\square (I) $y_i^* = AES_k(r_i) SHA(y_i r_i)$	\square (L) None of the above

information about patients even with each other (including their names) unless **both** hospitals know in advance that a patient has in fact used both hospitals. Bear Hospital will transform its names using $x_i^* = F_k(x_i)$, and Tree Hospital using $y_i^* = F_k(y_i)$, for some function F. A trusted third party S agrees to take the transformed names $x_1^*, \dots, x_n^*, y_1^*, \dots, y_n^*$ from both hospitals, and compute a set of pairs: $P = \{(i, j) : x_i^* = y_i^*\}$ We want to ensure three requirements with the above scheme: 1. if $x_i = y_i$, then $(i, j) \in P$, 2. if $x_i \neq y_i$, then it is very unlikely that $(i, j) \in P$, 3. even if Eve compromises S, she cannot learn the name of any patient at either hospital or the medical information for any patient. 4. Your solution must still provide guarantee 3 even if a new user with an extremely long (and unique) name were to join Caltopia. Below are potential candidates for a function *F*. Select all candidates that meet all four requirements. \square (A) $F_k(p) = AES-ECB_k(p)$ \square (D) $F_k(p) = SHA(p||k)$ \square (E) None of the above \square (B) $F_k(p) = AES-CBC_k(p)$ ☐ (F) — \square (C) $F_k(p) = SHA(p)$ Q3.4 (3 points) Same question as the previous part. Select all candidates that meet all four requirements. [NOTE: Not every question will have six answer choices. For Q3.4, you should only bubble any of options (G), (H), (I) you think are correct, or (J) if you think all options are incorrect. You should leave options (K) and (L) on your answer sheet blank.] \square (G) $F_k(p) = SHA(p)||SHA(k)|$ \square (J) None of the above □ (K) — \square (H) $F_k(p) = AES_k(r_i)||SHA(p||r_i)$ (L) — \square (I) $F_k(p) = AES-ECB_k(SHA(p))$ Q3.5 (3 points) Same question as the previous part. Select all candidates that meet all four requirements. \square (A) $F_k(p) = AES-CBC_k(SHA(p))$ \square (D) None of the above (E) — \square (B) $F_k(p) = SHA(AES-ECB_k(p))$ ☐ (F) — \square (C) $F_k(p) = SHA(AES-CBC_k(p))$

Q3.3 (4 points) The hospitals soon realize that, due to privacy laws, they cannot share any plaintext

Q3.6	(5 points) One possible choice for $F_k(p)$ is SHA($k p$), where $ $ is the concatenation operation.				
	Explain why $F_k(p) = SHA(k p)$ meets requirement (1) (if $x_i = y_j$, then $(i, j) \in P$).				
	$\square (G) \square (H) \square (I) \square (K) \square (L) $				
	[NOTE: Since this question has a large box and no multiple-choice options, you should leave th bubbles for Q3.6 blank on your answer sheet, and write your short answer for Q3.6 in the blan space below Q3 on your answer sheet.]				
23.7	(5 points) Explain why $F_k(p) = \text{SHA}(k p)$ meets requirement (2) (if $x_i \neq y_j$, then it is very unlike that $(i, j) \in P$).				
	$\square (A) \square (B) \square (C) \square (D) \square (E) \square (F) \square (E) - \square (E) \square (E) \square (E) \square (E) \square (E) - \square (E) \square (E) \square (E) - \square (E) - \square (E$				
	[NOTE: If a question has multiple short-answer questions, please be sure to clearly label yo answers to each subpart. If you need more space to write your answers, feel free to use anoth sheet of paper and be sure to upload it with the rest of your answer sheet.]				
Q3.8	(5 points) Explain why $F_k(p) = SHA(k p)$ meets requirements (3) and (4).				
	$\begin{picture}(1000000000000000000000000000000000000$				
stop	OTE: The actual exam will have more than 3 questions, but since this is the practice exam, we we here. You should now scan or take pictures of your answer sheet and upload it to the "Homewo ssignment on Gradescope. Thank you for trying out the practice exam!]				
Т	This is the end of Q3. You have reached the end of the exam.				