Peyrin & Ryan $Summer\ 2020$

CS 161 Computer Security

Final Review

Web Security

Ouestion	1	True/	false
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uestic	on 1 True/false				
Q1.1	1 True or False: Under the SOP, it is possible for two webpages with different origin communicate through narrowly defined APIs.				
	O TRUE	O FALSE			
Q1.2	TRUE or FALSE: Under the SOP, the webpa https://example.com/randompic.html https://cute-cats.com/cutest.jpg be	cannot fetch the image at			
	O TRUE	O FALSE			
Q1.3	TRUE or FALSE: Suppose the webpage at tains a child frame that loads https://anthe SOP, the parent frame can read and mod	other-example.com/index.html. Under			
	O TRUE	O FALSE			
Q1.4	(2 points) True or False: Suppose the webp contains a child frame that loads https://ethe child frame can read and modify the pro	example.com/views.html. Under the SOP,			
	O TRUE	O FALSE			
Q1.5	True or False: Suppose the webpage at hand runs an external script from https://sascript runs with the same origin as https:/	ample.com/script.js. Under the SOP, the			
	O TRUE	O FALSE			
Q1.6	TRUE or FALSE: Mallory convinces Alice Webpages Alice visits using this browser ma	•			
	O TRUE	O FALSE			

Question 2 Cauliflower Smells Really Flavorful

califlower.com decides to defend against CSRF attacks as follows:

- 1. When a user logs in, califlower.com sets two 32-byte cookies session_id and csrf_token randomly with domain califlower.com.
- 2. When the user sends a POST request, the value of the csrf_token is embedded as one of the form fields.
- 3. On receiving a POST request, califlower.com checks that the value of the csrf_token cookie matches the one in the form.

Assume that the cookies don't have the secure, HTTPOnly, or Strict flags set unless stated otherwise. Assume that no CSRF defenses besides the tokens are implemented, and that CORS is not in use (if you don't know what that means, do not worry about it). Assume every subpart is independent.

Q2.1	Suppose the attacker gets the client to visit evil.com. What can they do?	their malicious website which has domain
	$\begin{tabular}{l} \square (A) CSRF attack against {\tt califlower.com} \\ \end{tabular}$	☐ (D) None of the above
	☐ (B) Change the user's csrf_token cookie	□ (E) —— □ (F) ——
	\square (C) Learn the value of the session_id cookie	
Q2.2	Suppose the attacker gets the client to visit evil.califlower.com. What can they do	
	$\square(G)CSRFattackagainst\texttt{califlower.com}$	\square (J) None of the above
	\square (H) Change the user's csrf_token cookie	
	\square (I) Learn the value of the session_id cookie	□ (L) —
Q2.3	Suppose the attacker gets the client to visit a that contains a stored XSS vulnerability (the trolled by the attacker). What can they do?	page on the website xss.califlower.com e website xss.califlower.com is not con-
	\square (A) CSRF attack against califlower.com	\square (C) Learn the value of the session_id cookie
	☐ (B) Change the user's csrf_token cookie	☐ (D) None of the above

	□ (E) ——	□ (F) ——		
Q2.4	Suppose the attacker is on-path and observe to califlower.com. What can they do?	s the user make a POST request over HTTP		
	\square (G) CSRF attack against califlower.com	\square (J) None of the above		
	☐ (H) Change the user's csrf_token cookie	□ (K) ——		
	☐ (I) Learn the value of the session_id cookie	□ (L) —		
Q2.5 Suppose the attacker is a MITM and observes the user make a POST request over to califlower.com. What can they do?				
	\square (A) CSRF attack against califlower.com	\square (D) None of the above		
	☐ (B) Change the user's csrf_token cookie			
	☐ (C) Learn the value of the session_id cookie	□ (F) ——		
Q2.6	2.6 Suppose the attacker is a MITM. The victim uses HTTP and is logged into califlower. but will not visit califlower.com at all. Describe how this attacker can successfu perform a CSRF attack against califlower.com when the user makes a single requite any website. (Hint: Remember a MITM can modify a webpage over HTTP since there no integrity checks.)			

Question 3 SQL Enumeration

Alice runs a computing cluster. When a user wants to execute some job \$job, they visit:

https://alice.com/execute?job=\$job

Alice's server locally stores a SQL table named dns:

IP	hostname	jobs
10.120.2.4	gpus.alice.com	matrix-multiplication
10.120.2.75	cpu1.alice.com	matrix-addition
10.120.2.6	cpu2.alice.com	matrix-addition
:	:	:

Upon receiving a request, Alice's server makes the following SQL query:

SELECT IP, hostname FROM dns WHERE jobs='\$job' ORDER BY RAND() LIMIT 1

where \$job is copied from the request parameter. This SQL query finds all hosts in dns whose jobs field equals the string \$job, and randomly returns one of them. If successful, the job is sent to the specified IP, and the following webpage is returned:

Successfully launched job on hostname!

Otherwise an error code is returned. hostname is copied from the SQL query result.

Q3.1	What type of attack is the server vulnerable to?
	(A) SQL injection
	(B) ROP attack
	○ (C) CSRF attack
	(D) Path traversal attack

(E) None of the above

(F) —

Q3.2 Alice modifies the server to check that \$job contains only letters (a-z), dashes (-), quotes ('), and/or spaces ('). If \$job contains any other character, it rejects the request without making any SQL queries. Assume that the server's code includes the entire response from the SQL query in the web page for debugging purposes.

TRUE OR FALSE: It is possible to choose a value for \$job that will let Mallory learn all hostnames that can handle a matrix-addition job in a single visit to the web page. If you choose true, show such a value; if you choose false, explain why it's no longer possible. (Hint: -- starts a SQL comment. Assume that it does not need to be preceded or followed by a space.)

(G) True	O (H) False	(I) —	(J) —	(K) —	(L) —

Q3.3 Instead of the checks in the previous part, Alice implements a simple filter on the value of \$job:

```
def sanitize(job):
    job = job.replace('--', '') // Deletes all occurrences
        of --

job = job.replace(';', '') // Deletes all occurrences
        of;
return job
```

After calling sanitize, she checks that the result contains only letters (a-z), dashes (-), quotes ('), and spaces (), then uses it in the SQL query.

TRUE OR FALSE: It is still possible to choose a value for \$job that will let Mallory learn all hostnames that can handle a matrix-addition job in a single visit to the web page. If you choose true, show such a value; if you choose false, explain why it's no longer possible.

(A) True	(B) False	O(C)—	(D) —	(E) —	(F) —